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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Harley Gomez contends the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his
withheld judgment was improper under I.C. § 19-2604, which requires him to show there
were no violations of the terms of his probation which were found or admitted in a
probation violation proceeding in order to make a satisfactory application for relief. The
State concedes that he met that burden. The issue, then, is understanding what the
statute authorizes the district court to do after the defendant makes a satisfactory
application for relief.
The State contends the district court properly denied Mr. Gomez’s request for
relief because it properly found there was not “good cause” to grant that relief based on
its consideration of a potential, but unproven, violation of the terms of Mr. Gomez’s
probation.

The State’s reading of I.C. § 19-2604 fails to give meaning to several

portions of that statute.

Giving meaning to all the terms of the statute, the plain

language reveals Mr. Gomez should have been granted some form of relief
Furthermore, if I.C. § 19-2604 is determined to be ambiguous, the State asks this
Court to find legislative intent from a statement of purpose and the testimony of one
person about one amendment to the statute. That argument is inconsistent with Idaho
case law. Thus, in both respects, the State’s reading of I.C. § 19-2604 is mistaken and
should be rejected.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Gomez’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Gomez’s motion to dismiss his
withheld judgment.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gomez’s Motion To Dismiss His
Withheld Judgment

A.

The Plain Language Of The Statute Reveals Mr. Gomez Should Have Been
Afforded Relief Under I.C. § 19-2604
The State concedes that Mr. Gomez met his burden to show that no violations of

the terms of probation had been found or admitted during a probation violation hearing
in his case. (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, the State maintains the district court still
properly refused to grant Mr. Gomez relief under I.C. § 19-2604 because of the fact that
he had been convicted of a misdemeanor offense during the period of probation, which
might have constituted a violation of the term of probation, since one of the terms of his
probation agreement required he “be a law-abiding citizen and shall commit no
misdemeanors or felonies.” (See generally Resp. Br.) The argument that the district
court has discretion to deny relief entirely under the statute is improper because it fails
to give meaning to several parts of the statute. “When determining the plain meaning of
a statute, effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible.” Verska v.
Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011). To do that, the terms of
the statute are to be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. at 893.
Idaho Code 19-2604(b) reads, in relevant part:
Upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that:
(i) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of
the terms or conditions of any probation that may have been
imposed;
....
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the court, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause
for continuing the period of probation should the defendant be on
probation at the time of the application, and that there is good cause for
granting the requested relief, may terminate the sentence or set aside the
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant and finally dismiss the case
and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction
from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to ‘confinement
in a penal facility’ for the number of days served prior to sentencing, and
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.
I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b). The issue in this case, the difference between Mr. Gomez’s and
the State’s readings of the statute, focuses on what the district court is authorized to do
after the defendant makes a satisfactory showing that no allegations of probation
violations were proved or admitted.
Mr. Gomez contends that the statutory language clearly provides for four
potential forms of relief, and allows the district court to determine, in its discretion, which
form of relief is appropriate for the case at hand. See, e.g., State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989) (acknowledging that limits may be placed on the district court’s
discretion, and in such cases, the district court needs to “act within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices” in order to properly exercise its discretion).

Specifically, the district court

(1) may release the defendant from probation, if he is still on probation at the time;
(2) “may terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant”; (3) “or may amend
the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to
‘confinement in a penal facility’ for the number of days served prior to sentencing”; or
(4) “the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.”
(emphasis added).
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Id.

The State would add a fifth option to that list – the district court may decide not to
grant relief at all. Had the Legislature intended that to be an option, it would have
included language to that effect in the statute. Furthermore, reading such language into
the statute would deprive several parts of the statute of meaning. For example, it fails
to give meaning to the term “if convinced by the showing made.” While the State
correctly points out that this term refers primarily to the decision of whether to continue
probation (see Resp. Br., p.9), under the State’s reading, the district court could refuse
to discharge a defendant from probation under this statute if it found a lack of “good
cause” regardless of how convincing the defendant’s showing might have been. Thus,
the State’s reading of I.C. § 19-2604 deprives the term “if convinced by the showing
made” of meaning.

That shows the State’s reading of the statute is improper,

regardless of whether if that particular term is applicable to the specific facts of
Mr. Gomez’s case.
The State’s reading also fails to give meaning to the phrase: “that there is good
cause for granting the requested relief.” I.C. § 19-2604(b) (emphasis added). Since the
State is contending that, if the district court finds good cause, it may deny relief
altogether, the State reads the words “the requested” out of the statute, and instead,
interprets the statute as saying: “that there is good cause for granting relief.” As such,
the State’s reading of the statute is improper under its plain language.
Mr. Gomez’s reading of the statute, on the other hand, gives meaning to that
phrase as it is written: the defendant can make a request for any of the various forms of
relief available under the statute, but the district court could, in its discretion, decide not
to grant that “requested relief,” and grant a different form of relief instead. Thus, while
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Mr. Gomez requested the second form of relief – that the case be dismissed (R., p.40) –
the district court could, based on its consideration of this case, including his new
misdemeanor conviction, decide that Mr. Gomez should not receive that requested
relief, but one of the other, less-extensive forms of relief instead. (See App. Br., p.9
(requesting this Court remand this case for a determination of what relief is
appropriate).) Thus, the plain language of the statute sets the outer bounds of the
district court’s discretion, and the district court’s decision to deny relief entirely, which is
beyond those bounds, is improper under the plain language of the statue.
Because the State’s reading of I.C. § 19-2604(2) fails to give meaning to all the
terms of the statute, its interpretation fails to give effect to the plain language of the
statute, and so, should be rejected.

B.

If I.C. § 19-2604 Is Ambiguous, The Legislative History Reveals Mr. Gomez’s
Interpretation Of The Statute Gives Effect Its Legislative Intent
Although he does not concede that I.C. §19-2604(b) is ambiguous, should this

Court conclude it is, Mr. Gomez contends the amendments to that statute over the last
several years reveal a legislative intent to make relief more widely available within the
narrow group of cases in which the Legislature has determined such relief is
appropriate.

(See App. Br., pp.8-9.)

That legislative intent indicates Mr. Gomez’s

reading of the statutory language regarding what the district court is authorized to do
after the defendant has made a satisfactory showing, as discussed in Section A, supra,
is the more reasonable of the two interpretations of the statutory language identifying
the scope of the district court’s discretion after the defendant makes a satisfactory
application.
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The State, on the other hand, points only to a statement of purpose and the
minutes of one person’s testimony to a legislative committee related to one of those
amendments to support its more expansive reading of the statute. (Resp. Br., pp.1213.) The State’s argument is unpersuasive because neither a statement of purpose nor
individual testimony in a committee is indicative of the Legislature’s intent. Verska, 151
Idaho 892; State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 978-79 (Ct. App. 2014), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75 (2015).
For example, a statement of purpose “gives a generalized motivation behind the
statute shared by at least some of the legislators who passed the bill,” but it “is not an
official part of the final bill voted on by the entire legislature and enacted into law.”
Alley, 155 Idaho at 978 (citing Verska, 151 Idaho at 892). As such, it only “represents
the purpose of the bill’s sponsors and cosponsors in creating the bill, not the
legislature’s purpose in passing it.”

Id. at 979.

Thus, the State’s reliance on the

statement of purpose for one of the amendments to I.C. § 19-2604 to understand the
legislative intent of that statute is wholly misplaced.
Alley also explains, “The house and senate committee minutes pertaining to the
statute are equally unhelpful” in determining the legislative intent of a statute. Alley, 155
Idaho at 979. This is because “the minutes represent only the statements of interested
parties to a small portion of the legislature.” Id. at 979 n.3. Therefore, the State’s
reliance on the minutes’ recounting of one interested party’s interpretation of the
amendment’s purpose does not support its position that was the Legislature’s actual
intent in passing the amendment.
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Besides, according to the materials on which the State relies, the use of the term
“good cause” was intended to apply the “same standard that is used to guide a court’s
exercise of discretion in many other settings,” to the decision to grant relief under
I.C. § 19-2604.

(Resp. Br., p.12 (quoting the Senate Judiciary & Rules Committee

Minutes for March 3, 2014).)

The standard guiding the district court’s exercise of

discretion in other settings requires the district court to: (1) rightly perceive the issue as
one of discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600. What the State fails to appreciate is, as
discussed in Section A, supra, the Legislature has identified the outer boundaries of the
district court’s discretion in this regard.

See I.C. § 19-2604(2).

The State’s

interpretation of the statute would allow the district court to act beyond the outer
boundaries of its discretion. Thus, the State’s interpretation of the statutory language is
less reasonable. Therefore, even considering the materials upon which the State relies,
Mr. Gomez’s reading of the statute better reflects the legislative intent.
Finally, the State did not respond to Mr. Gomez’s argument that the rule of lenity
applies when a statute is ambiguous. (See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, he simply
refers this Court back to his argument on page 9 of the Appellant’s Brief in that regard.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests this Court vacate the order denying his motion
to dismiss the withheld judgment and remand this case for a determination of what
relief he should receive under the statute.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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